《Environmental and Resource Economics》刊登“基于不确定、不均匀气候损失的气候政策”

作者：Matthias G. W. Schmidt, Hermann Held, Elmar Kriegler, Alexander Lorenz

刊物：《Environmental and Resource Economics》，2013年，54卷第1期，79-99页

关键词：气候变化；气候政策；稳定目标；不确定性；不均匀性；损失；保险

摘要：本文强调：当气候损失的不确定性与损失通过全球人口不均匀分布结合在一起时，它们将成为制定更严格气候政策时争论的焦点。但当两者孤立时，并不会产生那么大影响。原因就在于由少数人承担既定气候风险意味着更大的福利损失。但是，只有当社会既存在风险又存在不平等或者当气候损失高度不均匀时，这些损失才会显得非常重要。本文讨论了气候风险保险和自保是如何从理论上削弱了不确定性和不均匀性的联合效应并包容了更软弱的气候政策。保险提供了更加有效的风险分担而自保则强烈影响着人们通过增加存款来补偿损失。本文首先运用简单的分析模型介绍了不同概念，然后提供了更多来自DICE综合评估模型的结果。

   Climate Policy Under Uncertain and Heterogeneous Climate Damages

Authors: Matthias G. W. Schmidt, Hermann Held, Elmar Kriegler, Alexander Lorenz

Journal: Environmental and Resource Economics, Volume54, 2013, Issue 1, pages 79-99

Key: words: Climate change; Climate policy; Stabilization target; Uncertainty; Heterogeneity; Damages; Insurance

Abstract: We highlight that uncertainty about climate damages and the fact that damages will be distributed heterogeneously across the global population can jointly be an argument for substantially stricter climate policy even if uncertainty and heterogeneity in isolation are not. The reason is that a given climate risk borne by fewer people implies greater welfare losses. However, these losses turn out to be significant only if society is both risk and inequality averse and if climate damages are highly heterogeneous. We discuss how insurance and self-insurance of climate risk could theoretically mitigate this joint effect of uncertainty and heterogeneity and thus admit weaker climate policy. Insurance provides more efficient risk sharing and self-insurance allows strongly impacted individuals to compensate damages by increasing savings. We first use a simple analytical model to introduce the different concepts and then provide more realistic results from the integrated assessment model DICE.

原文链接：http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10640-012-9582-2